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TAX
Atkinson v. O'Neill, 867 F.2d 589
Per Curiam
Plaintiff, Atkinson, appealed the district court's granting of sum-
mary judgment for the defendants on the ground that defendants, em-
ployees of the Internal Revenue Service, were entitled to absolute and
qualified immunity.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed, holding Atkinson sued the defendants
in their official, rather than individual, capacity and therefore Atkinson
sued the United States in essence. Since sovereign immunity was not
waived, the suit was barred. The court awarded damages and double
costs for Atkinson's legally frivolous appeal.
United States v. Cache Valley Bank, 866 F.2d 1242
Per Curiam
Plaintiff, United States, appealed the district court's ruling of sum-
mary judgment in favor of defendant, Cache Valley, after the govern-
ment filed an action to enforce a tax lien against a taxpayer's account.
The Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that the government's tax lien
had attached prior to Cache Valley's exercise of its right to offset the
taxpayer's debt against the bank deposits, and therefore, Cache Valley
took the deposits subject to the lien.
United States v. Church of World Peace, 878 F.2d 1281
Author: Judge Anderson
Petitioner, Church of World Peace ("Church"), turned over tax
records to respondent, United States, pursuant to a district court order
enforcing an Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") summons. The Tenth
Circuit later set aside the enforcement order in its entirety and re-
manded. On remand, the Church moved for return of all records and
copies thereof from the United States. The United States moved for
enforcement of the summons to the extent of the copied documents in
its possession. Both motions were denied. Both sides appealed.
The Tenth Circuit held that both of the appeals were moot since the
Church had complied with the summons. Compliance with an IRS sum-
mors renders any appeal of a district court enforcement order moot.
Taxpayers who have complied with a summons may adequately protect
their asserted interest by challenging the IRS procedure if and when the
government attempts to make further use of the information obtained
by the summons.
DENVER UNIVERSITY LI W REVIEW
Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Oklahoma v. Oklahoma Tax
Commission, 888 F.2d 1303
Author: Judge McKay
Plaintiff, Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Oklahoma
("Tribe"), sought to enjoin defendant, Oklahoma Tax Commission
("Commission"), from enforcing a $2.7 million tax assessment against
the Tribe for cigarettes sold in a tribal convenience store. The store is
located on land which is held in trust by the federal government for the
Tribe. The Commission asserted a counterdaim for declaratory and in-
junctive relief. The Tribe moved to dismiss the counterclaim, contend-
ing that the district court lacked jurisdiction. The Tribe argued that it
enjoys sovereign immunity and, therefore, cannot be sued unless it
consents.
The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of the Tribe's
motion to dismiss and remanded with directions to dismiss. The court
held that the Tribe is immune from suit and the district court lacked
jurisdiction to adjudicate the counterclaim. The court also reversed the
district court's denial of the Tribe's request for injunction. Instead, the
court issued a remand to the district court for an entry of a permanent
injunction on behalf of the Tribe. The court held that because the con-
venience store is located on land over which the Tribe retains sovereign
powers, the Commission had no authority to tax the store's transactions
unless the Commission received an independent jurisdictional grant of
authority from Congress.
United States v. Colorado, 872 F.2d 338
Author: Judge Tacha
Plaintiff, United States ("Government"), appealed a summary judg-
ment granted in favor of defendant, State of Colorado ("State"), hold-
ing that the State's purchase of seized property at a tax sale did not
extinguish state tax liens and that state tax liens retain priority over fed-
eral liens despite the State's failure to give notice to the Government
prior to the sale. The Tenth Circuit affirmed.
The Government argued that the State's purchase of the property
extinguished the State's senior lien by merging that lien with fee title to
the property, thereby elevating the Government's lien to first priority.
Merger occurs when a greater and a lesser estate coincide in the same
person, without any intermediate estate, unless a contrary intent ap-
pears. Applying Colorado law, the Tenth Circuit ruled that the State's
interest plainly supported its intent to preserve its lien.
The Government further contended that regardless of merger,
I.R.C. § 7425 requires that the State should lose its senior lien priority
for failure to give the Government notice of the sale. The court held
that section 7425 merely prevents federal tax liens from being extin-
guished through sale of the underlying collateral, but does not other-
wise alter federal priority rules. Federal law governs the priority of a tax
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lien against other claims to property. Under federal law, the Govern-
ment's lien is preserved and the State's lien remains senior to the Gov-
ernment's lien.
Eggleston v. Colorado, 873 F.2d 242
Author: Judge Tacha
Law enforcement officials seized property as proceeds of illegal
drug trafficking. The federal Drug Enforcement Agency ("DEA"), the
Internal Revenue Service ("IRS"), and the Colorado Department of
Revenue ("CDR"), all made claims on the property.
The district court found the CDR's claim valid for the state income
tax lien. The court, however, denied the liens for state sales tax and the
Regional Transportation District tax because the state did not show the
sale was retail rather than wholesale. The district court held the state
income tax lien had priority over the federal lien because the state filed
first. The DEA's claim was under 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1982)..The district
court denied the DEA's claim because the, forfeiture did not relate back
to the time of the offense.
In reversing the district court's ruling, the Tenth Circuit held that
21 U.S.C. § 881 (1982), provides for immediate forfeiture of all property
at the time the illegal act is committed. The forfeiture divests all rights
of subsequent ienholders except for innocent owners as provided in 21
U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) (1982). The court held the state of Colorado was not
entitled to the. sales tax portion because the innocent owner exception
only applies to interest which vests before the illegal act. The sales tax
did not exist until the vendor received value from the purchaser. There-
fore, the Colorado Department of Revenue was not an innocent owner.
Estate of Bruning v. Commissioner, 888 F.2d 657
Per Curiam
Petitioner, Bruning, as personal representative of the decedent's es-
tate, brought suit in the Tax Court against the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue ("Commissioner"). Bruning sought a redetermination of a de-
ficiency in estate tax asserted by the Commissioner. The Tax Court held
that Bruning was entitled to an unlimited marital estate tax deduction.
The Commissioner appealed, arguing that Bruning should be allowed
only a limited marital deduction.
Affirming the Tax Court's decision, the Tenth Circuit permitted
Bruning to claim an unlimited marital estate tax deduction. The court
stated that the purpose of section 403(e)(3) of the Economic Recovery
Tax Act of 1981 is to preserve the testator's intent, and the trust estab-
lished under the decedent's will did not contain a maximum marital de-
duction formula clause. Thus, the testator's intent was to minimize
estate taxes rather than to limit the amount of marital deduction. The
testator's will, therefore, qualified for an unlimited marital deduction.
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United States v. Hays, 877 F.2d 843
Author: Judge Ebel
The district court found that under Colorado's Uniform Partnership
Act, one partner's agreement with the Internal Revenue Service
("IRS"), to pay the dissolved partnership's past-due employment taxes
does not discharge the other partner from liability for those taxes. The
court found that although the IRS negotiated with one partner, Hays, to
pay the taxes, it never purported to release its claims against the second
partner, Manley.
The Tenth Circuit upheld the district court's finding. The court
conduded that the agreement between the IRS and Hays was not a "ma-
terial alteration" in the nature of the already-due tax obligation. Rather,
it was a simple forbearance on the IRS's part to collect the taxes. More-
over, liability was not discharged under general surety principles. The
court reasoned that the IRS continued to reserve its rights against Man-
ley throughout its negotiations with Hays. The court, therefore, held
that because there was no material change in the underlying debt that
Manley and Hays owed to the IRS, section 36(3) of the Uniform Partner-
ship Act did not discharge Manley's liability.
Jackson v. Commissioner, 864 F.2d 1521
Author: Judge Tacha
Plaintiff Jackson's deduction for lease amortization and advertising
expenses was disallowed by the tax court and penalties were imposed for
failure to timely file returns.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed, holding that a taxpayer's legal capabil-
ity to sell licensed goods, without actual efforts to sell them, was insuffi-
cient evidence to establish a legitimate business deduction. The court
reasoned that the deduction did not meet the "carrying on of a trade or
business" requirement. The court further held that a taxpayer's reliance
upon his accountant's advice that he need not comply with the law be-
cause no penalty will occur is not a reasonable excuse for late filing.
Jay v. United States, 865 F.2d 1175
Author: Judge Bright, sitting by designation
Dissent: Judge McWilliams
The district court held defendant, Jay, personally liable as a matter
of law for failure to pay taxes withheld from employee paychecks to the
federal government. On appeal, Jay, the company comptroller, argued
that he was not the responsible person for payment of the withholding
taxes under I.R.C. § 6672. Rather, Jay claimed that the company presi-
dent was the responsible person for directing Jay to pay creditors other
than the federal government.
The Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded the case for a trial on the
merits, finding that the record did not establish Jay's liability as a matter
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of law. The jury must determine if Jay possessed enough authority to
make him a responsible person for the payment of taxes.
Leder v. Commissioner, 893 F.2d 237
Author: Judge Tacha
Plaintiff's decedent, Leder, purchased an insurance policy two years
prior to his death, naming his wife owner and beneficiary. Months
before his death, Leder's wife transferred the policy to herself as trustee
of an inter vivos trust. Leder satisfied all payments on the policy, and
therefore, his wife gave no consideration. Defendant, Commissioner of
Internal Revenue ("Commissioner"), determined that the proceeds of
the policy were properly induded in Leder's gross estate under the In-
ternal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 2042. Leder's estate, however chal-
lenged the determination in tax court. The tax court held that the policy
proceeds could not be included in Leder's gross estate under Internal
Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 2035(d), where the decedent never pos-
sessed any of the incidents of ownership in the policy under section
2042.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed ihe district court. The court reasoned
that this is a statutory construction case of first impression regarding
pertinent sections of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981
("ERTA"). Although section 2035(a), generally requires that any prop-
erty transferred by the decedent within three years of death, for less
than full consideration, be included in the decedent's gross estate,
ERTA changed the law. ERTA added section 2035(d), for estates of
decedents dying after 1981. The court held that the plain language of
section 2035(d)(2), specifically cross-references the definition of "inci-
dents of ownership" set out in section 2042. The court refused to apply
the constructive transfer doctrine as judicial gloss. The court reasoned
that under section 2042, payment of premiums is irrelevant in determin-
ing whether the decedent retained any "incidents of ownership" in the
policy proceeds.
Pollei v. Commissioner, 877 F.2d 838
Author: Judge Seymour
Defendants, Pollei and Patrick, appealed a United States Tax Court
decision upholding deficiencies assessed against their federal income tax
return for 1981. At issue was whether Pollei and Patrick could deduct as
"ordinary and necessary" business expenses, maintenance and operat-
ing costs arising from their use of personally-owned, unmarked police
cars to travel between their residences and police headquarters when
they were required to be on dutr. The tax court concluded that such
travel constituted nondeductible personal commuting. The Tenth Cir-
cuit reversed.
Since the tax court applied the law to undisputed facts, the court
determined that de novo review was appropriate. The court found that
because Pollei and Patrick were required to be on duty while traveling to
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and from work, they were allowed to deduct maintenance and operating
costs on the cars as "ordinary and necessary" business expenses.
Wall v. Commissioner, 875 F.2d 812
Author: Judge Logan
Plaintiff, Wall, appealed a decision of United States Tax Court hold-
ing that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue was not barred from is-
suing Wall a notice of deficiency almost six years after Wall had
executed Form 872-A, an indefinite waiver of the three-year limitations
period on income tax assessments. The issue on appeal was whether the
Commissioner should be estopped to assess the deficiency because he
made it within an allegedly unreasonable period of time after Wall had
executed Form 872-A.
The Tenth Circuit agreed with the Tax Court's refusal to apply a
reasonable time limitation to the validity of the indefinite waiver signed
by Wall. The court stated that to rule otherwise would subject the courts
to increased litigation to determine what time period constitutes "rea-
sonable." The court also noted that Wall failed to execute Form 872-T,
which would have terminated his waiver. In extreme cases, such as
where twenty years has passed without contact with the taxpayer by the
Internal Revenue Service, the court stated it might find the government
is barred from issuing a notice of deficiency.
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